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Introduction

“Gentlemen, as I have no secrets from you, in the spirit of
confidence you have engendered between us,” Charles Dickens
addressed a Connecticut audience during his 1842 American tour, “I
would beg leave to whisper in your ear two words, International
Copyright.”1 This conflation of intellectual property interests and
confidentiality typified Dickens’s savvy strategy for addressing the
question of transatlantic copyright; he recognized that casting his
listeners as privileged intimates and his concern as personal, rather
than financial, would in fact bolster his argument for a lucrative
public agreement. But his appeal, I would argue, also suggestively
harnessed two concepts that were of vital importance to Victorian
authors—privacy and intellectual property. Because professional
authorship in the nineteenth century was a contested territory,2
Dickens and his contemporary and friend, Elizabeth Gaskell, often
cloaked their literary endeavors in secrecy. More fundamentally, they
regarded writing as a personal matter. Even as their novels circulated
in the burgeoning literary marketplace, they understood their artistic
creations to have unique private value, and within their fiction they
impressed the importance of privacy and its strong conceptual
relationship to intellectual property.
The relationship between privacy and intellectual property has
resurfaced with a twist at the turn of the twenty-first century. If
Victorian authors regarded intellectual property as private,
contemporary proposals instead urge us to regard private information
as property. In response to technological developments that have
facilitated unprecedented invasions of individuals’ privacy, some
scholars have advocated legally classifying private information as a
3
form of property. These scholars insist that the best way to respond
1. Quoted in ALEXANDER WELSH, FROM COPYRIGHT TO COPPERFIELD: THE
IDENTITY OF DICKENS 32 (1987).
2. See generally MARY POOVEY, THE PROPER LADY AND THE WOMAN WRITER:
IDEOLOGY AS STYLE IN THE WORKS OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, MARY SHELLEY,
AND JANE AUSTEN (1984) (discussing the problematic nature of professional authorship
for female writers).
3. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1193, 1246-94 (1998); Kenneth C. Laudon, Extensions to the Theory of Market and
Privacy: Mechanics of Pricing Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 43 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce ed., 1997); Lawrence Lessig, The
Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63-65 (1999); Patricia Mell,
Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic
Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1, 26-41 (1996); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights
in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L. J. 2381, 2383 (1996;
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to privacy violations, particularly corporate commodification of
personal data,4 is to invest people with property rights that would
furnish control over their personal information.5 Insofar as
intellectual property rights are currently understood to protect
commodities, such proposals could dangerously redefine privacy
rights and commodify the self.6 If, however, we instead conceptualize
intellectual property as Victorian authors urged, a careful mapping of
intellectual property onto privacy could offer robust protection. A
relatively unheralded development of moral rights in nineteenthcentury intellectual property law, advanced by authors in courtrooms
and literary works alike, insisted that the right to control written
expression stemmed from its close connection to the self and treated
copyright as a matter of personal, rather than solely economic
interest. The earliest arguments for a legal right to privacy, at the end
of the nineteenth century, capitalized on this understanding: to
ground the individual’s right to control private information, the most
influential of these proposals, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s
“The Right to Privacy,” invoked copyright cases that defined literary
Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal Data in the
Global Information Economy, 87 CAL. L. REV. 751, 769-73 (1999) (book review). See
generally Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? 52 STAN. L. REV.
987 (2000) (containing arguments both for and against treating private information as
property). Although privacy encompasses many different areas, including physical privacy
and decisional privacy, I focus in this paper on informational privacy.
4. See, e.g., FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 14-15 (1997);
John Hagel III & Jeffrey F. Rayport, The Coming Battle for Customer Information, HARV.
BUS. REV. 53 (1997); Kang, supra note 3, at 1198-99. In the U.S., a right of privacy does
not exist when a person has published a matter by communicating it to a third party. See
WILLIAM L. PROSSER & JOHN W. WADE, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1962), at 934.
The licensing of information by one company to another, when the information has
voluntarily been communicated to the first company, therefore does not constitute a
violation of privacy rights. In Europe, by contrast, it is illegal for a firm to release personal
data to a third party or to use such data for a purpose unrelated to the reason for which it
was collected. See Council Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, art. 6, 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. For a comparative analysis of the regulation of
personal information in the U.S. and Europe, see PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R.
REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW (1996).
5. See supra note 3; see also Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMM.
ACM SEPT. 1996, at 92 (“Why not let individuals own the information about themselves
and decide how the information is used?”); Pamela Samuelson, Information As Property:
Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?,
38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 366 (1989) (suggesting the inevitability of treating private
information as property).
6. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1125, 1143 (2000) (comparing treating privacy as a form of property to commodifying
voting rights and citing Pamela S. Karlan, Not By Money But By Virtue Won? Vote
Trafficking and the Voting Rights System, 80 VA. L. REV. 1455 (1994)).
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works as articulations of their creators’ personalities and held that the
right to control such works inhered in their intimate relationship to
the self. 7
The Victorian novels of Gaskell and Dickens anticipated the finde-siècle argument that privacy is about control over personal
information and is therefore closely related to intellectual property
rights. In their works, these authors treat various forms of intellectual
property as uniquely private creations, and they also use intellectual
property as a model for privacy because it furnishes control without
necessitating commodification. Dickens’s and Gaskell’s fiction
accentuates the interpersonal nature of both privacy and intellectual
property. Because it concerns more than one character, the novel
probes how people negotiate privacy concerns, and it simultaneously
fosters an intimate relationship among characters, author, and reader.
Indeed, while Dickens’s appeal to his Connecticut audience may
strike us as curious because he seeks intimacy with a mass audience,
this is precisely what he and Gaskell attempted in their novels. They
compensated for financial motives and mass publication by casting
their literary endeavor as the creation of an almost domestic intimacy;
and they sheltered the privacy of their novels by suggesting that
readers engendered their confidences through the very act of reading,
much as the Connecticut gentlemen seemingly educed Dickens’s
personal reflections through the mere act of listening. Ultimately,
Dickens’s and Gaskell’s novels dramatize privacy and intellectual
property as mutually constitutive concepts, and the privileged view
we attain through reading, I will argue, can usefully inform current
debates.
In Part II of the paper, I establish the historical context, using
Warren and Brandeis’s article to frame my discussion. I also explore
the novel’s distinctive relationship to both copyright and privacy. In
Part III, I examine the careers and works of Charles Dickens and
Elizabeth Gaskell and discuss how these authors placed questions of
privacy and intellectual property in a dialogue in their lives and their
novels. I focus on how Dickens’s and Gaskell’s works illustrate
privacy’s interpersonal dimensions: their novels dramatize the threat
to autonomy and intimacy that results from market-driven appraisals
of personal information, but they also posit a communal privacy that
ensures the dignity of individuals. In Part IV, I address the reader’s
relationship to the privacy of the novel and maintain that novels do

7. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
200-05 (1890).
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not hypocritically invade privacy, as many critics have argued, but
rather teach their readers to value private information within a
literary framework. I conclude the paper with a discussion of how
Victorian novels can inform contemporary debates about intellectual
property and privacy.

II. Intellectual and Historical Context
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their
foundational argument for the individual’s right to privacy. In their
article, the lawyers turn with particular enthusiasm to intellectual
property cases from the mid-Victorian years, when an array of
developments in both people’s lifestyles and the common law drew
attention to and changed the nature of privacy concerns. Relying on
British and American copyright cases from this era, Warren and
Brandeis extract a right to privacy from rulings that granted authors
control over the publication of self-expression. But it was not, I will
argue, nineteenth-century judicial opinions that most thoughtfully
advanced the individual’s privacy. Rather, in their literary works,
Victorian novelists presented a compelling model of the relationship
between privacy and artistic expression and, in so doing, prefigured
Warren and Brandeis’s advocacy of a right to privacy grounded in
intellectual property rights.
1.

Urbanization and Industrialization

Urbanization and industrialization in the nineteenth century
posed threats to the self and self-expression that effected a new
awareness of privacy, and recognition of the individual’s vulnerability
endowed privacy with social meaning.8 A primary focus of Victorian
privacy concerns was the doctrine of separate spheres. This
prescriptive doctrine defined government and market as a public,
masculine sphere and championed the home as a private, feminine
sphere, even as political manifestos and artistic depictions offered up
domesticity for mass consumption. Intersecting with this gendered
discourse was a growing preoccupation with individuals’ control over

8. Privacy has not always been valued: “In ancient feeling the privative trait of
privacy, indicated in the word itself, was all-important; it meant literally a state of being
deprived of something . . . . We no longer think primarily of deprivation when we use the
word ‘privacy,’ and this is partly due to the enormous enrichment of the private sphere
through modern individualism,” which occurred particularly in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 38 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1998) (1958).
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personal information, as industrialization and urbanization increased
both publicity and spatial proximity.
Urbanization at once seemed to threaten and secure individuals’
privacy. The astounding growth of cities brought strangers into
immediate physical contact, but it also facilitated anonymity. In
contrast to life in the country, which typically offered spatial isolation
but little informational privacy, urban settings furnished virtually no
physical privacy, but enabled people to keep personal matters to
themselves.9 As if to counteract their loss of seclusion, city dwellers
came to appreciate the private value of personal information, and
they were alive to both their own secrets and those of their neighbors.
Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities reflects upon the “wonderful fact . . .
that every human creature is constituted to be [a] profound secret and
mystery to every other” and describes the realization, upon entering
a city at night, “that every one of those darkly clustered houses
encloses its own secret; that every room in every one of them encloses
its own secret; that every beating heart in the hundreds of thousands
of breasts there, is, in some of its imaginings, a secret to the heart
nearest it!”10 Much as politicians and artists paradoxically
underscored the privacy of the domestic sphere by subjecting it to
society’s gaze, public proclamations of privacy, particularly in
literature, became essential to city residents’ belief that their private
lives were shielded from view.
As urbanization recast personal information as a valuable private
good, the Industrial Revolution transformed public information into a
valuable social commodity: “Among the vast array of goods and
materials produced during the aggressive onset of industrialism in
Britain in the early Victorian period, none was more widely
disseminated, more instrumental to everyday life, more essential to
the shaping of industrial culture than information.”11 Paper
production multiplied, stamp taxes were repealed, and railroads

9. See GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 336-37 (Kurt H.
Wolff ed. & trans., 1950) (arguing that “modern life has developed, in the midst of
metropolitan crowdedness, a technique for making and keeping private matters secret,
such as earlier could be attained only by means of spatial isolation”); IAN WATT, THE
RISE OF THE NOVEL: STUDIES IN DEFOE, RICHARDSON AND FIELDING 179 (2000) (1957)
(claiming that the “combination of physical proximity and vast social distance is a typical
feature of urbanisation”).
10. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 17 (Random House 1993) (1859).
11. Joseph W. Childers, Industrial Culture and the Victorian Novel, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE VICTORIAN NOVEL 77, 77 (Deirdre David ed., 2001).
See also RICHARD DANIEL ALTICK, THE ENGLISH COMMON READER: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF THE MASS READING PUBLIC: 1800-1900 (1983).
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flourished, facilitating the ready distribution and widespread
availability of printed material. In this hearty culture of information,
literacy rates increased dramatically, and people were willing to pay
for knowledge—the sales of newspapers and serial publications
soared. Notably, society’s very dependence on information betokened
that it might have market value not only upon publication, but also
when kept secret; concealing certain matter could be desirable
precisely because of its worth to others.
The coupling of urbanization and industrialization created
conditions for both greater privacy and greater publicity.
Developments that decreased seclusion and rendered information a
valuable commodity increased the desirability of keeping personal
matters secret, while at the same time increasing the likelihood that
privacy would be invaded. Privacy’s dialectical relationship with its
violation ensured that it was often valued to the extent that it was
threatened. Victorian privacy was also conceptually linked to writing,
and specifically to works circulating in the public sphere. Because
writing could be the site of personal disclosures as well as a form of
property, concerns about informational privacy were bound up in
questions of intellectual property, and Victorian authors convincingly
articulated the relationship between these concepts.
2.

Conceiving Privacy Through Intellectual Property

At the end of the nineteenth century, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis published their seminal proposal for a common-law right to
privacy in the Harvard Law Review.12 “The Right to Privacy” casts
privacy as a peculiarly modern need; as the press has invaded
personal lives, the lawyers argue, people have “become more
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more
essential to the individual.”13 Their article therefore proclaims the
right of the individual to be “let alone” and establishes as the basis for
this right the principle of an “inviolate personality.”14
To establish legal precedent for a right to privacy, Warren and
Brandeis turn to several intellectual property cases, which, they
argue, actually hinged on the author’s right to privacy. In some
12. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7. As Warren and Brandeis themselves note, their
article was preceded by Judge Thomas Cooley’s inclusion of the right “to be let alone” as a
class of torts in 1880, as well as a July 1890 article by E.L. Godkin in Scribner’s Magazine.
Id. at 195. Nonetheless, Warren and Brandeis’s article is so much more expansive than
these precedents that it is fitting to regard it as the first theory of the right to privacy.
13. Id. at 196.
14. Id. at 205.
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respects, their reliance on intellectual property law appears
misguided. Despite a degree of confusion in their own text about
whether privacy rights should be distinguished from property rights
or should be regarded as a species of property rights,15 Warren and
Brandeis ultimately attempt to disentangle the individual’s privacy
from property. Given the longstanding Anglo-American tradition of
protecting artistic works because of the labor that has gone into
producing them and of granting economic, rather than personal rights
in such works,16 the lawyers’ reliance on intellectual property law
could be considered a counterproductive move that would indelibly
link privacy and property.
It would seem that Warren and Brandeis should have looked
instead to the continental European system of the droit moral, or
“moral right,” which grants authors a bundle of personal and

15. They argue, for instance, “The right of property in its widest sense, . . . hence
embracing the right to an inviolate personality, affords alone that broad basis upon which
the protection which the individual demands can be rested.” Id. at 211. But they also insist,
“The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions . . .
against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that
of an inviolate personality.” Id. at 205. Walter Benn Michaels argues that Warren and
Brandeis’s “explicit attempt to shift privacy away from property nonetheless produced a
dramatic extension of property rights, produced, in effect, new property.” Walter Benn
Michaels, The Contracted Heart, 21 NEW LITERARY HIST. 495, 526 n. 13 (1990).
16. Anglo-American property law, including intellectual property law, is based
fundamentally on John Locke’s conception of property, which maintains that “every man
has a property in his own person . . . . Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967)
(1690). Labor is central to this conception, and statutes have traditionally awarded
economic rights in intellectual property. For its entire early history, British intellectual
property law did not even protect the interests of authors; instead, both printing patents,
granted by the crown, and the Stationers’ Company guild system settled property rights on
the printers and sellers of works. For a thorough history of publishing in early modern
England, see ADRIAN JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE BOOK: PRINT AND KNOWLEDGE IN
THE MAKING (1998). Other valuable histories of intellectual property include JOHN
FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT
IN BRITAIN (1994); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT (1993); PAUL K. SAINT-AMOUR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
LITERARY IMAGINATION (2003); DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT
(1992); THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994). It is noteworthy that the
“sweat of the brow” theory, rewarding labor, has been largely revised in American law.
See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 US 340 (1991) (rejecting the
“sweat of the brow” basis for intellectual property rights and holding that the determining
factor in was the originality of the creation, not the labor expended on its creation).
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inalienable rights in their works.17 Such rights include: the droit de
divulgation (the right of disclosure, which allows authors to decide
when and where to publish); 18 the droit de repentir ou de retrait (the
right to correct or withdraw published works); 19 the droit de paternite
(the right to be acknowledged as the author);20 and the droit au respect
de l’ouevre (the right of integrity, which prevents mutilation or
distortion that would harm the author’s reputation).21 The droit moral
explicitly recognizes the personal connection between authors and
their creations and lends rights to safeguard the individual’s private
self as expressed in artistic works. Protection is based on the
individual’s personality, and this intellectual property system, rather
than the Anglo-American tradition, therefore appears more
conducive to Warren and Brandeis’s argument.22
Warren and Brandeis themselves acknowledged certain
limitations of grounding a right to privacy in Anglo-American
intellectual property rights.23 They also, however, recognized a
subterranean development of the moral right in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century common law, and it is this development that they
17. Law on the Intellectual Property Code, No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, in World
Intellectual Property Org., Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Laws and Treaties (1996)
[hereinafter French Act]; Urheberrechtgesetz (UrhG) § IV.2, arts. 12-14 <http://iecl.
iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/UrhG.htm> [hereinafter German Act]. The term droit moral was
coined by Andre Morillot, a French jurist, and later codified in the French Intellectual
Property Code. See Code de la Propriete Intellectuelle, in ANDRE RANCON, COURS DE
PROPRIETE LITTERAIRE, ARTISTIQUE ET INDUSTRIELLE 289-322 (1993). The German
term Urheberpersönlichkeitsrecht means the “author’s right of personality” and more
closely conveys the idea that the rights concerned are perceived as arising from the
creator’s personality. See Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral,
76 N. C. L. REV. 1, 6, n. 40 (1997).
18. French Act, supra note 17, art. L. 121-2; German Act, supra note 17, art. 12.
19. French Act, supra note 17, art. L. 121-4.
20. French Act, supra note 17, art. L. 121-1; German Act, supra note 17, art. 13.
21. French Act, supra note 17, art. L. 121-1; German Act, supra note 17, art. 14.
22. In recent years, moral rights have become increasingly visible not only in
international intellectual property agreements, but also in Anglo-American intellectual
property law. Most important, and likely spurred by the United States’ accession to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1989, the Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990 explicitly recognizes limited moral rights for visual
artists. Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). I will argue, however, that moral
rights in Anglo-American intellectual property law extend back to Victorian times,
although the codification of such rights was a vexed and contradictory process. See
generally Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing for the
existence of certain moral rights for authors under American common law).
23. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at n. 33 and accompanying text (discussing
intellectual property rights as a reward for labor).
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turn to in their article.24 Noting that copyright statues have secured for
authors the profits from publication of their works, Warren and
Brandeis insist that a more robust common-law tradition has enabled
authors to “control absolutely the act of publication.”25 In their
article, such control over self-expression and, more generally, selfrelevant information becomes the central component of privacy: “the
individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given
to the public.”26
Most notably, Warren and Brandeis look to a case that upheld
authors’ prepublication rights in Victorian England: Prince Albert v.
27
Strange. At stake in this case was whether authors owned their
works prior to publication, and thus whether they could keep their
works to themselves if they so chose. The judges explicitly cited
Prince Albert’s property rights to enjoin the printing of a catalogue of
his etchings, but they further implied a right to privacy in written
works: “Upon the principle, therefore, of protecting property, it is
that the common law . . . shelters the privacy and seclusion of thought
and sentiments committed to writing, and desired by the author to
remain not generally known.”28 Because the quality of the work was
immaterial to the author’s right to determine whether to publish, the
judges maintained that their decision applied to all creations, whether

24. A personality rationale for intellectual property rights, which grounded literary
property interests in conceptions of the self, appeared in England as early as the
eighteenth century. Pope v. Curll famously conflated issues of privacy and property to rule
that the material property of letters did not convey copyright in the contents, which
remained with the author until publication was granted. Justice Hardwick rejected
Edmund Curll’s claim that a letter is a gift to the receiver and separated the material
contents of the letter (which belonged to the receiver) from the intangible expressions
(which belonged to the writer). He thereby established copyright as the protection of the
immaterial and authors as independent creators with the right to control their works’
publication. Pope v. Curll, 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch. 1741). In Donaldson v.
Beckett, the court treated literary works in an analogous fashion: Justice Yates argued that
publication of a literary work was a gift to the public, but the majority rejected his claim in
favor of the author’s sole ownership. Donaldson v. Beckett, 17 Parl. Hist. Eng. 953 (H.L.
1774). Both the prevailing and dissenting opinions of such cases as Pope v. Curll and
Donaldson v. Beckett informed later rulings in British copyright disputes, as judges
wrestled with questions about where copyrightable material resided (e.g., in the sequence
of words, the immaterial ideas, the expression’s personality, the possession of the
document). See generally, ROSE, supra note 16; THE LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE: SIX
TRACTS, 1764-1774 (Stephen Parks ed., 1975); THE LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE:
EIGHT TRACTS, 1774-1775 (Stephen Parks ed., 1974). Warren and Brandeis particularly
focus on nineteenth-century cases in their article.
25. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 7, at 200.
26. Id. at 199.
27. 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849), aff’d, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
28. Id. at 312.
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publishable or not.29 The ruling turned on the belief that artistic works
were not mere commodities, but rather forms of self-expression that
authors had the right to keep to themselves. Prince Albert v. Strange
thus seemed to acknowledge that artistic creations deserved
protection because they were intimately connected to their creators’
private selves, and to cast personality as the basis of literary property.
Generalizing from this and similar cases,30 Warren and Brandeis
extract a right to privacy from intellectual property law. “[T]he
common-law right to intellectual and artistic property” is an
application “of a general right to privacy,”31 they maintain, for “[t]he
same protection is accorded to a casual letter or an entry in a diary
and to the most valuable poem or essay.”32 For Warren and Brandeis,
intellectual property rights protect individuals’ decisions about
whether to communicate their thoughts and emotions, and necessarily
implicate privacy, which concerns the individual’s right to control
information about the self. Indeed, Warren and Brandeis argue that
the intellectual property cases they discuss are not ultimately about
property, but rather privacy: “Although the courts have asserted that
they rested their decision on the narrow grounds of protection to
property, yet there are recognitions of a more liberal doctrine,”
namely the individual’s right to privacy.33
Warren and Brandeis make a compelling argument that these
cases furnish more capacious protection of personal thoughts and
sentiments than intellectual property law traditionally would have
provided. Prince Albert v. Strange, for example, would seem to
protect not only expression (the province of copyright law), but also
the ideas underlying such expression, with the ultimate goal of
sheltering the individual. While these cases extend beyond
intellectual property rights to implicate privacy, they also highlight
the unique nature of intellectual property. By underscoring authors’
29. The Vice Chancellor noted that an author, “whether he is famous or obscure, low
or high,” had the right to control the publication of his manuscripts, “whether interesting
or dull, light or heavy, saleable or unsaleable.” Quoted in Warren & Brandeis, supra note
7, at 199 n. 5.
30. Most relevant, Warren and Brandeis cite the American case Woolsey v. Judd,
which held that the publication of private letters without the consent of the writer was a
violation of the writer’s property interest. Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 51, 4 Duer 379,
383, 11 N.Y. Super. Ct. 379, 383 (1855). Warren and Brandeis also discuss Millar v. Taylor,
98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769), cited in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 198, n. 2., and
,
Jefferys v. Boosey 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854), cited in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at
194, n. 6., 200, n. 2.
31. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 198.
32. Id. at 199.
33. Id. at 204.
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personal investments in their works, Warren and Brandeis suggest
that the creation of intellectual property is often necessarily a private
and personal activity.
3.

Authors on Copyright

It is perhaps natural, then, that while the courtroom regulated
struggles over copyright and laid the groundwork for “The Right to
Privacy,” it was authors themselves who most persuasively advocated
for moral rights in their artistic creations. At the turn of the
nineteenth century, the Romantics began to stress the individuality
and uniqueness of literary works. In earlier centuries, authors had
been regarded as craftsmen, but Romantics including Edward Young,
Immanuel Kant, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte insisted that authors did
not merely imitate nature, but rather created original works derived
from their own personalities.34 So too, England’s Romantic Poets—
William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Percy Bysshe
Shelley, John Keats, and William Blake—celebrated the author as a
solitary and unique genius.35 The English language even nodded to
this new conception of authorship, as the word “original” underwent
a semantic reversal. During the Middle Ages, it meant “having
existed from the first,” but in the late eighteenth century it came to
mean “underived, independent” and was often used in conjunction
with “genius” to express an author’s particular novelty.36
One Romantic author in particular took his claims outside of the
lines of poetry and embarked on a political crusade on behalf of
extended copyright privileges. Wordsworth urged Thomas Noon
Talfourd to propose a copyright bill so that he could pass on property
rights in his works as an inheritance. Wordsworth was driven no
doubt in large part by economic motives, but he was also deeply
protective of his poetry as a personal emanation, something

34. See generally FREDERICK NEUHOUSER, FICHTE’S THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1990); Martha Woodmansee, THE AUTHOR, ART & THE
MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 53-54 (1994) (quoting Edward
Young’s conjecture that an original work “may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises
spontaneously from the vital root of genius; it grows, it is not made”).
35. See, e.g., SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA (1817). See
generally M.H. ABRAMS, THE MIRROR AND THE LAMP: ROMANTIC THEORY AND THE
CRITICAL TRADITION (1958); HAROLD BLOOM, THE VISIONARY COMPANY: A
READING OF ENGLISH ROMANTIC POETRY (1961); LESLIE BRISMAN, ROMANTIC
ORIGINS (1978); LOGAN PEARSALL SMITH, FOUR WORDS: ROMANTIC, ORIGINALITY,
CREATIVE, GENIUS (1924).
36. WATT, supra note 9, at 14.
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intimately linked to his conception of self.37 For him, literary property
“embodied an aspect of essential character; a function of individual
identity, it was inalienable.”38 He sought protection for his literary
creations not only for financial reasons, but also because they were
inextricably linked to his identity. Similarly, Talfourd compared
literary property to a person’s character: “[W]hy do you protect
moral character as a man’s most precious possession, and compensate
the party who suffers in that character unjustly by damages? Has this
possession any existence itself half so palpable as the author’s right in
the printed creation of his brain?”39 Both Wordsworth and Talfourd
argued that literary works were fundamentally related to authors’
persons and should therefore remain under their control. Some fifty
years later, Warren and Brandeis would echo this argument in their
“Right to Privacy.”
Wordsworth, Talfourd, and other authors, including Dickens,
successfully brought intellectual property issues to national attention,
and several copyright statutes, furnishing increasing protections, were
promulgated in England in the mid-nineteenth century.40 The most
important of these was the Copyright Amendment Act of 1842, which
37. John Milton perhaps prefigured not only Wordsworth’s poetry but also his legal
wrangling when he insisted in 1649 that Sir Philip Sidney owned Arcadia because it was an
emanation of his person. When King Charles I appropriated part of the poem on the eve
of his execution, Milton called this “a trespass also more than usual against human right,
which commands that every author should have the property of his own work reserved to
him after death, as well as living.” JOHN MILTON, EIKONOKLASTES, in JOHN MILTON:
COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 781, 794 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., Odyssey, 1957).
38. SUSAN EILENBERG, STRANGE POWER OF SPEECH: WORDSWORTH,
COLERIDGE, AND LITERARY POSSESSION 204 (1992). See also Paul M. Zall, Wordsworth
and the Copyright Act of 1842, 70 PMLA 133 (1955) (arguing that in the copyright debate,
Wordsworth insisted on the difference between works of art and other commodities).
39. Quoted in SAUNDERS, supra note 16, at 128. For a comprehensive discussion of
Talfourd’s struggles on behalf of copyright reform in the early nineteenth century, see
CATHERINE SEVILLE, LITERARY COPYRIGHT REFORM IN EARLY VICTORIAN
ENGLAND: THE FRAMING OF THE 1842 COPYRIGHT ACT (1999).
40. The process by which authors came to enjoy greater control over their works
during the mid-Victorian era was in fact two-fold: they learned how to gain back control
over rights they had once signed away, and new rights were also created. Additional rights
came first through customary usages within the profession. For instance, American
publishers, forfeiting profits because many copies of each pirated book appeared on the
market, developed a system of “courtesy of the trade” to limit competition: they respected
the first house to announce a publication of a title not protected under American
copyright laws, such as an English novel, and thereby maximized profits of “authorized”
editions. See LEWIS A. COSSER, CHARLES KADUSHIN, & WALTER W. POWELL, BOOKS:
THE CULTURE AND COMMERCE OF PUBLISHING 20 (1982). New rights also emerged
through domestic statutes and bi-lateral and international treaties. During the nineteenth
century, then, authors both increasingly asserted rights over their works and benefited
from the development of new rights.
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was the first piece of legislation put forth by and for authors. 41 This
Act established the term of copyright as the author’s lifetime plus
seven years or 42 years from publication—whichever was longer. It
therefore specifically aligned the property rights of authors with their
lives and classified written works as expressions of self deserving
special protection. In the 1854 case Jefferys v. Boosey, Lord Justice
Erle vividly extended the analogy between a work and its author:
“[I]n ordinary life no two descriptions of the same fact will be in the
same words . . . . The order of each man’s words is as singular as his
countenance.”42
This particular trajectory of intellectual property law
developments, spearheaded by authors themselves, thus provided the
conceptual grounding for privacy rights. Copyright established a
precedent for conferring property rights on immaterial expression,
and, more important, suggested that people were entitled to control
self-relevant information. Sociologist Georg Simmel maintains, “Just
as material property is, so to speak, an extension of the ego, and any
interference with our property is, for this reason, felt to be a violation
of the person, there is also an intellectual private property, whose
violation effects a lesion of the ego in its very center.”43 As he
proposes, personal information can be considered a species of
intellectual property over which the individual exercises control.
Many theorists of privacy have indeed cast control, rather than
inaccessibility, as its central element. Charles Fried writes that
“privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the
minds of others; rather, it is the control we have over information
about ourselves.”44 Such legal control over private information
41. Copyright Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45 (Eng.). Authors argued that the 1709
Statute of Anne had invested them, rather than publishers, with copyright, and indeed the
Statute did grant rights to authors. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1709) (Eng.). A
primary purpose of the Statute, however, was to promote competition among printers and
booksellers, and the rights of authors were not realized in practice. See generally RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); ROSE, supra note 16.
42. 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 703 (H.L. 1854).
43. SIMMEL, supra note 9, at 322.
44. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L. J. 475 482 (1968). Similarly, Alan Westin
defines privacy as the “claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others.” ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). See also SISSELA BOK,
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 19-20 (1982) (arguing
that “[c]ontrol over secrecy provides a safety valve for individuals in the midst of
communal life—some influence over transactions between the world of personal
experience and the world shared with others”); AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT
SOCIETY 201, 204 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996) (maintaining that violations of privacy
restrict “individuals’ control, against their will, over what is supposed to be within their
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fundamentally resembles and is derived from copyright, which, as
Warren and Brandeis argued, furnishes authors not only with profits
arising from sales, but also with the more expansive personal right to
regulate the publication of their works.
4.

The Novel

While Warren and Brandeis productively looked to legal rulings
to ground their right to privacy, it is not judicial opinions that best
illustrate privacy’s relationship to intellectual property, but rather
literary works themselves. Victorian novels in particular illuminate
the connection between our modern conceptions of privacy and
intellectual property, which were, in many ways, coincident with the
rise of the novel. The novel has consistently been associated with
intellectual property rights—as the only literary genre wholly
connected with print, it is unequivocally protected under copyright,
which has traditionally covered written, but not oral, works. From its
inception, the novel has also been concerned with private
experience.45 Ironically, however, the novel posits the importance of
its characters’ privacy while circulating their stories in public.
Dickens’s discussion of the city’s secrets in A Tale of Two Cities
underscores the potential gap between the privacy novelists champion
and the publicity their novels effect.46 According to some critics, the
novel demonstrates its concern with privacy by invading the private
sphere and displaying it to a mass audience.47
The novel’s exploration of private lives, however, is not
ultimately a hypocritical violation of the privacy novelists claim to
control”); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA (2000) (exploring legal, technological, and cultural changes that have
undermined the individual’s control over how much personal information is
communicated to others, and arguing that the injury inflicted by invasions of privacy is
that of being judged out of context). But see ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY
FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988) (arguing that inaccessibility, rather than control,
is the most important aspect of privacy).
45. WATT, supra note 9, at 174-207.
46. See DICKENS, supra note 10.
47. See, e.g., PETER BROOKS, BODY WORK: OBJECTS OF DESIRE IN MODERN
NARRATIVE (1993); KAREN CHASE & MICHAEL LEVENSON, THE SPECTACLE OF
INTIMACY: A PUBLIC LIFE FOR THE VICTORIAN FAMILY (2000). The publicity of privacy
also resembles Foucault’s assertion that modern societies speak about sex endlessly “while
exploiting it as the secret.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 35
(Robert Hurley trans., 1980). There may in fact be a direct connection, because much of
what is private in modern societies concerns sexual behavior, and, as Kate Flint argues,
there was a close “proximity of textuality and sexuality in discourses of reading
throughout the Victorian and early Edwardian period.” KATE FLINT, THE WOMAN
READER: 1837-1914, at 4 (1993).
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champion. Rather, privacy is valued and protected through the
privileged communion among reader, characters, and author. By
dramatizing both invasions and protections of personal information,
fiction illustrates privacy’s significance, and it models approaches to
private information for the reader. The novel’s exploration of
characters’ inner lives also effects a deep identification of readers
with these characters, so that as novels portray private lives, they
influence the reader’s own consciousness. The solitude in which
people typically read novels further fosters their intimacy with the
text. Walter Benjamin argues that stories are heard in the presence of
others, and readers of poems are prepared to utter words aloud, but
novel readers withdraw into themselves, so that the “reader of a
novel . . . is isolated, more so than any other reader.”48 It is also worth
noting that the novel’s rise in the eighteenth century was
contemporaneous with increased domestic privacy, which entailed the
establishment of separate sleeping quarters for every member of the
family and locks on doors.49 The novel accordingly came to be
associated with domestic spaces and a retreat from others. Even when
novels were read in public, for example on trains during the Victorian
era, they were a means of obtaining privacy in a public space; writers
of Victorian advice manuals recommended that women traveling
alone carry books that would serve as “bodyguards” by enabling them
to avoid conversation with strangers.50
The novel is, then, a doubly private genre, for it explores the
subjectivity of characters and is also a site of the reader’s private
experience. In addition, the novel reflects concerns about the author’s
own privacy and self-expression, and these are bound up with
questions of intellectual property. As several nineteenth-century legal
cases suggest, Victorian authors believed their literary creations were
connected to their inmost selves, and they argued for the natural right
of authors to control publication. In publishing their works, these
authors carefully negotiated their own privacy with regard to their
readers. Within their novels, an emphasis on the importance of
characters’ control over personal information highlights the strong
conceptual relationship of intellectual property and privacy, and

48. Walter Benjamin, The Storyteller, in ILLUMINATIONS 83, at 100 (Hannah Arendt
ed., 1968).
49. WATT, supra note 9, at 188. These are clearly middle- and upper-class privileges,
and indeed privacy has traditionally been a class-based entitlement. The Victorian novels
of Dickens and Gaskell, however, insist that privacy rights must not be limited to those
who can afford them, as I will discuss.
50. FLINT, supra note 47, at 105.
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anticipates the intellectual-property-grounded right to privacy posited
by Warren and Brandeis. Much as copyright inheres in individuals’
ability to control the publication of their self-expression, privacy in
these novels inheres in individuals’ control over personal information.
Charles Dickens and Elizabeth Gaskell, who were among the
most popular writers of the Victorian era, offer particularly
compelling access to Victorian authors’ ideas about privacy and
intellectual property. Their later works sold tens of thousands of
copies, and their novels were read by people of all classes and ages,
and by men and women alike. They also both published in serials,
including Dickens’s own Household Words and All the Year Round,
so that readers continuously enjoyed their novels throughout the midVictorian era. Their voices at once informed and responded to public
opinion. Both novelists locate private information prominently in
their works and employ their own intellectual property to show not
only how privacy should be valued and preserved in the imagined
communities of their novels, but also how the reader—by assuming
the proper relationship to the author’s intellectual property and the
characters’ privacy—can become a part of these private novelistic
communities.
III. Plotting Privacy: Charles Dickens and Elizabeth Gaskell
Given Dickens’s and Gaskell’s immense popularity, it may seem
ironic that private information holds a privileged place in their novels.
This is only a superficial paradox, however, for the mass circulation of
their works impressed upon them the importance of protecting
privacy and of exercising control over literary expression. Indeed, in
their often embittered battles to protect copyright in their works,
Dickens and Gaskell invoked their personal relationships to their
texts and the privacy concerns that, they argued, lay at the heart of
their desire to control these works. Within their novels, they
imaginatively explore the status of intellectual property, and they
insist that the author of a novel, or letter, or architectural plan, has
the right to control the publication of this creation because it is a form
of self-expression. Taking a cue from their treatment of intellectual
property, Dickens and Gaskell conceptualize privacy along similar
lines—for their characters, control over personal information is the
defining feature of privacy. In their novels, as in their lives, the
authors situate privacy and intellectual property in a mutually
enriching dialogue: casting private information as a form of personal
intellectual property furnishes the individual with the right to control
it, while casting intellectual property as a private communication
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highlights its personal connection to the author and invests it with
unique importance.
1.

The Author’s Plea: Privatizing Intellectual Property

A. Charles Dickens

For Dickens in particular, concerns about copyright manifested
as concerns about privacy, and he skillfully wove a discourse of
private investment and interpersonal confidences around his literary
works. The United States, in his life and fiction, came to symbolize
the need for both privacy and intellectual property rights, because he
associated the country with intrusions into his personal life and the
pirating of his literary works. During his 1842 tour, he complained of
being “so beset, waylaid, hustled, set upon, beaten about, trampled
down, mashed, bruised and pounded by crowds, that I never knew
less of myself in all my life, or had less time for those confidential
interviews with myself whereby I earn my bread, than in the United
States of America.”51 As this passage suggests, invasions of privacy
threatened both Dickens’s sense of himself and his ability to write.
Throughout his life he needed solitude for his literary endeavors, and
his works stemmed from self-communion. By invading his privacy,
Americans also tampered with his artistic output.
Dickens’s association of privacy and textual integrity not only
reflected a personal concern during this trip, but also lay at the center
of his visit’s agenda—to make his voice heard in the contentious
debate over international copyright.52 If he believed that literary
creations were in some important way private, he also realized that
embedding intellectual property concerns in a vocabulary of privacy
could earn him the sympathy and trust of his audience. In a letter to
Jonathan Chapman about international copyright, he wrote, “I open
my whole heart to you, you see! I write in such a spirit of confidence
that I pour out all I have felt upon this subject,—though I have said
nothing in reference to it, even to my wife.”53 As I have discussed,
Dickens similarly attempted to establish intimacy with an audience in
51. Quoted in J. Hillis Miller, The Sources of Dickens’s Comic Art: From American
Notes to Martin Chuzzlewit, 24 NINETEENTH-CENTURY FICTION 467, 469 (1970). Dickens
also described young women requesting locks of his hair and complained that, while he
was still on the ship, “[A] party of ‘gentlemen’ actually planted themselves before our little
cabin, and stared in at the door and windows while I was washing, and Kate lay in bed.” Id.
52. See WELSH, supra note 1, at 30. Welsh extensively cites Dickens’s American
speeches, and I draw upon his wealth of information.
53. 3 THE LETTERS OF CHARLES DICKENS 77 (Madeline House et al. eds., 1974)
(Feb. 22, 1842).
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Connecticut by implying that the assembled crowd had solicited his
confidences and then whispering the words “International Copyright”
in their ears.
One reason, no doubt, for his treating intellectual property issues
as a private subject was his desire to distance himself from pecuniary
motives, which were, nonetheless, of utmost importance to him. An
international copyright agreement would have been a boon for
Dickens, who was immensely popular in the U.S. as well as England,
but advocating for such an agreement was precarious in a time when
professional authorship was considered an ungentlemanly pursuit.
Propriety demanded that a degree of privacy surround the debate
over a transatlantic copyright agreement. Dickens’s description of his
interest in more elevated terms—as the protection of his
personality—also reflects, however, his belief that intellectual
property was not like other property, for it was the expression of the
private self. His American speeches and letters reveal both his
awareness that disavowing monetary interest was, paradoxically, the
best way to make copyright pay, and his more fundamental conviction
that intellectual property was the site of his private investment. He
not only masked, but also compensated for his economic motives by
discussing intellectual property as a personal matter and by creating
54
an intimate relationship with the “dear reader” of his novels.
Martin Chuzzlewit responds directly to Dickens’s American
experiences and is, characteristically, both a playful and scathing
account. A pivotal moment in the novel is Martin’s discovery that Mr.
Pecksniff has usurped his grammar-school design. According to the
novel’s logic, this theft is inevitable; when Pecksniff first asks Martin
to design the school, the narrator notes that “there were cases on
record in which the masterly introduction of an additional back
window, or a kitchen door, or a half-a-dozen steps, or even a water
spout, had made the design of a pupil Mr. Pecksniff’s own work, and
had brought substantial rewards into that gentleman’s pocket.”55 This
is, of course, what happens when Pecksniff adds four windows to
Martin’s design and claims credit, leaving Martin fuming, “My
grammar-school. I invented it. I did it all. He has only put four
windows in, the villain, and spoilt it!”56
54. See infra Part IV for a discussion of Dickens’s relationship with his reader. See
also GARRETT STEWART, DEAR READER: THE CONSCRIPTED AUDIENCE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH FICTION (1996) (discussing reader address in the
Victorian novel).
55. CHARLES DICKENS, MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT 94 (Penguin Books 1999) (1843-44).
56. Id. at 522.
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Legally, Pecksniff has committed no offense, because Martin was
in his employ when he designed the building. Nonetheless, readers
experience this as an odious theft: Pecksniff has stolen Martin’s
unique creation. Martin’s exclamation that Pecksniff has “spoilt it”
highlights his personal investment in the work and contrasts with
Pecksniff’s greedy pecuniary motives. For Martin, intellectual
property is no mere commodity, but an expression of the self;
Pecksniff’s theft has stripped him of control over his creation, so that,
unlike the successful plaintiffs in Victorian intellectual property cases,
he has lost his prepublication rights and suffered the attendant
violation of his self. Within Martin Chuzzlewit, Dickens dramatizes
his own crusade on behalf of international copyright; he distinctly
separates personal and pecuniary motives in the characters of Martin
and Pecksniff and privileges Martin’s orientation. Martin’s concern
with his personal investment and self-expression rather than money
underscores Dickens’s insistence that the author’s natural right to his
57
works trumps financial considerations.
If Martin Chuzzlewit suggests the private value of intellectual
property generally, David Copperfield extends that novel’s claims to
literary property. This rather autobiographical work examines literary
privacy from the standpoint of a character-author who is in many
ways a surrogate for the novelist himself, and David’s authorial career
conflates the ownership of private experience and written works. Like
Dickens, who needed solitude to write and first published under a
pseudonym, David carefully conceals his writing: “I have taken with
fear and trembling to authorship. I wrote a little something in secret,
and sent it to a magazine, and it was published in the magazine.”58 He
is anxious about publishing, it seems, because his works are closely
tied to his person and reflect his private self even as they are
constituted as property. It is the reflection of the author, Dickens
insists, that merits protection, and he advances this claim indirectly in
his own preface to the novel by linking the book to himself: “an
Author feels as if he were dismissing some portion of himself [when
he publishes a book].”59
Given the association of privacy and intellectual property in
Dickens’s life and novels, it is perhaps not surprising that he
57. See Gerhard Joseph, Charles Dickens, International Copyright, and the
Discretionary Silence of Martin Chuzzlewit, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP,
supra note 16, at 260, 269.
58. CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 582 (Random House 2000) (18491850).
59. Id. at xxvii.
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fictionally models invasions of privacy as thefts of intellectual
property. In Martin Chuzzlewit, Pecksniff echoes his theft of Martin’s
design when he eavesdrops on a secret conversation between Tom
Pinch and Mary Graham and then usurps Tom’s role in the
discussion. Whereas Mary had spoken to Tom confidentially about
Pecksniff’s unwelcome advances, Pecksniff accuses Tom of addressing
“Miss Graham with un-returned professions of attachment and
proposals of love.”60 He even pretends that Tom’s feelings of
disillusionment are his own and thereby appropriates Tom’s private
emotions to justify firing him. Much as Pecksniff steals and
transforms Martin’s grammar-school, he steals and transforms Tom
and Mary’s private discussion. These two thefts are in many ways
parallel cases; in both instances, Pecksniff impinges on other
characters’ personalities and recasts their self-expression as a form of
property that he controls. What had been meaningful because of its
intimate connection to the self, in Pecksniff’s hands assumes a value
independent of its proper owner and serves to advance his own
interests.
It is not only through Pecksniff’s usurpation that Martin’s
personal information becomes another’s property, for his entire
American experience, like Dickens’s, is an exercise in invasions of
privacy that transform his personal life into a public commodity.
From the moment he arrives in the U.S., newspaper editors bombard
the ship to advertise their papers. As their names signify, the New
York Family Spy, New York Private Listener, New York Peeper, and
New York Keyhole Reporter commodify the private information of
others as their exclusive property. As Dickens would complain in
American Notes, these newspapers occupy themselves by “pulling off
the roofs of private houses, . . . pimping and pandering for all degrees
61
of vicious taste.” After some of his personal letters appear in the
Watertoast Gazette, Martin learns just how closely he must guard his
private information from becoming public property, for not only
newspapers, but nearly every “distinguished gentleman” he meets
“procur[es] information of any sort in any kind of confidence, and
afterwards pervert[s] it publicly.”62 By the end of his trip, Martin has a
newfound appreciation for privacy and a desire to protect his
personal information, and this makes him acutely sensitive to
Pecksniff’s theft of his intellectual property upon his return to
60. DICKENS, supra note 55, at 472.
61. CHARLES DICKENS, 1 AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 210, 211
(1842).
62. DICKENS, supra note 55, at 504.
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England. Upon Dickens’s own return from the U.S., he continued to
crusade for an international copyright agreement that would protect
his intellectual property and his privacy, and he advanced his agenda
in part by embedding his concerns in his copyrighted novel, Martin
Chuzzlewit.
B. Elizabeth Gaskell

Elizabeth Gaskell’s first novel, Mary Barton, which she
published anonymously, similarly engages questions of privacy and
publicity that have a direct bearing on her own experience. The
mapping of private and public spheres, which occurs throughout the
novel, is most apparent when Mary’s former lover is killed by her
father, who works at his factory, and blame falls on Jem Wilson,
Mary’s future husband. Mary’s testimony at the widely attended
murder trial suggests some of the complications of female privacy in
the Victorian era. She is called to testify about her relationship to Jem
and is asked to publicly disclose information that conventions of
female modesty would prevent her from sharing even with Jem
himself—that she loves him. For a woman to declare her love, other
than in response to a male offer of marriage, was to cast herself as a
desiring subject and therefore to disregard propriety.
Female modesty, so highly valued during the Victorian era, was
defined in terms of privacy, but in fact strictures of modesty meant
that women often did not have control over what they did and did not
disclose. They were required not to discuss certain matters, and their
personal information was therefore not their own to publish or not as
they saw fit. Immediately after Mary refuses Jem’s marriage proposal,
for instance, she realizes that she loves him, but she cannot tell him
because “[m]aidenly modesty . . . seemed to oppose every plan she
could think of for showing Jem how much she repented her decision
63
against him.” Victorian modesty, then, conformed to a model of
privacy-as-inaccessibility, rather than privacy-as-control, and it
highlights potential shortcomings of the former approach. Unlike the
control model, which is informed by intellectual property and stresses
individual decisions about personal information, the inaccessibility
model does not accommodate the individual’s choice of what should
be published.
Ironically, the public trial enables Mary to disclose her love:
“[N]ow she might even own her love. Now, when the beloved stood
thus, abhorred of men, there would be no shame to stand between her
63. ELIZABETH GASKELL, MARY BARTON 132 (Penguin Books 1996) (1848).
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and her avowal.”64 The rules of female modesty are subordinate to
justice during the trial, and Mary temporarily becomes an
autonomous legal subject. The public courtroom fosters meaningful
privacy, for it empowers her to choose whether to share her personal
information. She keeps to herself certain private knowledge that
would be devastating evidence—that her father is the murderer—
while disclosing her love for Jem. The very demands of the public
trial paradoxically allow her more complete control over, and
ownership of, private information than she could typically exercise as
a woman in Victorian society.
Mary’s desire to retain privacy and not become a spectacle
following the trial approximates Gaskell’s own desire to keep the
authorship of the anonymously published Mary Barton private.
Although Mary’s friend tells her, “You can’t hide it now, Mary, for
65
it’s all in print. . . . Why! it was in the Guardian,—and the Courier,”
Mary recedes from the public view and attempts to shelter herself and
Jem. Similarly, once Gaskell’s novel was “all in print” she tried to
retain control over the private information that she was the author. In
a letter to Edward Chapman, she expressed her displeasure with the
publication process in terms of privacy: “Hitherto the whole affair of
publication has been one of extreme annoyance to me, from the
impertinent and unjustifiable curiosity of people, who have tried to
force one either into an absolute denial, or an acknowledgement of
what they must have seen the writer wished to keep concealed.”66 The
very first sentence of her preface to the novel further expresses her
desire to maintain privacy despite publication: “Three years ago I
became anxious (from circumstances that need not be more fully
alluded to) to employ my self in writing a work of fiction.”67 Like her
heroine, who wants both to enter the public sphere and to keep
64. Id. at 325.
65. Id. at 358.
66. THE LETTERS OF MRS. GASKELL, at 64 (J.A.V. Chapple & Arthur Pollard eds.
1967) (1966) (Dec. 5, 1848). Apparently Gaskell also hid beneath the breakfast table when
Mary Barton was mentioned: “Elizabeth Gaskell, the anonymous novelist who ducked
under the breakfast table to hide her embarrassment at the mere mention of Mary Barton,
duplicates Mary’s mixed humiliation and pride in her position at the center of the
spectacle.” HILARY SCHOR, SCHEHEREZADE IN THE MARKETPLACE: ELIZABETH
GASKELL AND THE VICTORIAN NOVEL 41 (1992).
67. GASKELL, supra note 63, at 3. This is, of course, a teasing comment, and critics
have sought to uncover these private circumstances, which most take to be the death of
her ten-month-old son, William, in 1845. Margaret Homans discusses another private
impetus for Gaskell’s writing: the death of her first child, a stillborn daughter, some fifteen
years earlier. MARGARET HOMANS, BEARING THE WORD: LANGUAGE AND FEMALE
EXPERIENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY WOMEN’S WRITING 224 (1986).
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certain matters private, Gaskell wants to publish her novel without
forfeiting her personal privacy. Literary publication, she insists, must
not be incongruous with privacy, for the author, not the audience,
should control the terms of disclosure.
In The Life of Charlotte Brontë, a biography that Gaskell wrote
in 1857 following her friend’s death, Gaskell suggests that her
concerns about privacy upon literary publication were shared by
contemporary female authors. For Brontë, the act of publishing
threatened a publication of the self, and following the publication of
Jane Eyre she too insisted upon her right to privacy, declaring to a
correspondent, “I have given no one a right to gossip about me.”68
Sounding much like Gaskell upon the publication of Mary Barton,
she further invoked legal terminology to insist, “I have given no one a
right either to affirm, or to hint, in the most distant manner, that I was
‘publishing.’”69
As the similarity of Gaskell’s and Brontë’s concerns implies,
Victorian women found themselves in a precarious position when
they wrote for publication and monetary gain. Nineteenth-century
literary discourse assumed its authority by distancing itself from the
masculine sphere of the market; writing was feminized, but in a way
that had nothing to do with actual women and depended instead on
an idealized view of the domestic sphere.70 Accordingly, “for a woman
to depart from that idealization by engaging in the commercial
business of writing was to collapse the boundary between the spheres
of alienated and nonalienated labor. A woman who wrote for
publication threatened to collapse the ideal from which her authority
was derived.”71 Gaskell sought to balance issues of propriety, privacy,
and literary property in her publishing, and she negotiated her
position in the literary marketplace by treating her novels as personal
creations and casting remuneration as a response to time and
emotion. “I am also inclined to put a very high value upon [my
copyright], because, naturally I value it according to the anxiety
thought & trouble it has cost me,” she told her publisher, George
Smith.72

68. ELIZABETH GASKELL, THE LIFE OF CHARLOTTE BRONTË 266 (Penguin Books
1997) (1857).
69. Id.
70. See generally MARY POOVEY, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENTS: THE IDEOLOGICAL
WORK OF GENDER IN MID-VICTORIAN ENGLAND (1988).
71. Id. at 125.
72. THE LETTERS OF MRS. GASKELL, supra note 66, at 427 (Dec. 20, 1856).
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It was not, though, only female authors who treated their
intellectual property as inalienable self-expression, and Gaskell’s
comment could readily have come from Dickens’s pen as he
attempted to distance his intellectual property interests from
monetary concerns. Like Dickens, but with more at stake because of
her gender, Gaskell contended that her literary works were
intertwined with her private life even as she negotiated lucrative
contracts regarding the publication of her works. She treated
copyright as a matter of recognizing writers’ close relationships to
their creations, and she insisted upon exercising control over her
works. In turn, because her literary works were the site of many of
her own privacy concerns, Gaskell’s conception of intellectual
property informed her fictional representation of privacy, which
inhered for her in the individual’s control.
2.

Commodifying Privacy: The Threat of Blackmail

Of course, as Gaskell and Dickens were keenly aware, treating
private information as a form of intellectual property might not so
much confer the right to control its publication as turn privacy itself
into a commodity. One reason that the two authors invoked the
personal basis of their literary creations was, in fact, to bolster their
commercial interests in their works; by casting literary works as
personal they made a compelling claim for remuneration. But as I
have argued, this is but a partial explanation, for Dickens and Gaskell
genuinely believed their works were intimately connected to
themselves. So too, they recognized private information as something
of particular personal value, and in their works they specifically
condemned blackmailers for treating private information as a
commodity rather than an aspect of self. By dramatizing the threat to
autonomy and intimacy that results from blackmailers’ market-driven
appraisals, Gaskell and Dickens emphasized the specifically non73
commercial value of private information and intellectual property.
Dickens’s most memorable characters are his oily villains who
invade other characters’ personal lives and trade in private
information. In Martin Chuzzlewit, not only Pecksniff but also Tigg
Montague perverts personal information by blackmailing Jonas
Chuzzlewit. Montague transforms Jonas’s secret into information
with an explicit monetary value—Jonas must pay him to keep his

73. For an important discussion of blackmail in the Victorian novel and the work of
George Eliot in particular, see ALEXANDER WELSH, GEORGE ELIOT AND BLACKMAIL
(1985).
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secret, and Montague threatens exposure: “Reason the matter. If you
don’t my secret is worthless to me; and being so, it may as well
become the public property as mine.”74 Taken together, Montague’s
and Jonas’s disparate assessments of private information constitute a
central aspect of blackmail. The blackmailer regards secrets as a
commodity, while the victim prizes secrets because they represent the
self. In Dickens’s novels, the perspective of the individual who suffers
blackmail is privileged—private information, like intellectual
property, is valuable because of its relation to the self. Blackmailers’
threats of publicity highlight their corrupt understanding of private
information, which is not a commodity to be placed on the market,
but rather a form of intellectual property that should be controlled by
the individual it concerns.
In Bleak House, Dickens again focuses on blackmail to stress
privacy’s value, and he documents the harm that occurs when others
treat one’s private information as property. In the novel’s economy,
the more private a communication, the more it is worth to other
characters, who will exploit it as a commodity. Mr. Tulkinghorn, who
slyly “carries family secrets in every limb of his body and every crease
of his dress,” particularly excels at appropriating other people’s
75
identities and thereby controlling them. Most notably, he claims
ownership of Lady Dedlock’s most valuable secret—her private past.
When he blackmails her, she says “If, sir, in my knowledge of my
secret—” and he interrupts, “It is no longer your secret. Excuse me.
That is just the mistake. It is my secret . . . . If it were your secret,
Lady Dedlock, we should not be here holding this conversation.”76
Lady Dedlock’s private information becomes property at the very
moment she loses control over it. Tulkinghorn redefines her life story:
what had been valuable to her as information about her private self is
now valuable to him because it gives him power over her, and he uses
it to deny her privacy and self-determination.
Ultimately, this blackmail leads to the consumption of Lady
Dedlock’s life, the narrative of which becomes public property. Her
private history comes to ground others’ reputations, as “people who
know nothing and ever did know nothing about her, think it essential
to their reputation to pretend that she is their topic too and to retail
her at second-hand with the last new word and the last new
manner.”77 This publication and commodification of Lady Dedlock’s
74.
75.
76.
77.

DICKENS, supra note 55, at 598.
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 176 (Penguin Books 1980) (1853).
Id. at 664.
Id. at 790.
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life constitutes such a serious invasion of privacy that, as the property
of others, she can no longer live. The loss of her control over private
information entails, quite literally, a loss of self.
In Elizabeth Gaskell’s final and unfinished novel, Wives and
Daughters, a pivotal invasion of privacy again positions itself at the
intersection of gossip and blackmail, and gossip compounds
blackmail’s injury. As in all of Gaskell’s novels, gossip is
predominantly a harmless staple of communal living. Anticipating
Warren and Brandeis’s description of gossip in physical terms as a
crop to be harvested,78 Gaskell writes that “gossip had been [Mrs.
Goodenough’s] daily bread through her life, gossip was meat and
wine to her now.”79 Aware of gossip’s prevalence, the novel’s
characters selectively guard their private lives from view. Lady
Cumnor, for instance, lets anyone read her husband’s letters, for
“[t]here was no fear of family secrets oozing out in his sprawling lines
of affection,”80 but she closely guards her daughters’ letters, which
may well ooze secrets to attentive eyes. Like Warren and Brandeis
who note, “Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and
persistently circulated, is potent for evil,”81 Lady Cumnor recognizes
that gossip can function as a species of blackmail by transforming an
individual’s private information into another’s valuable property. In
the case of gossip, which is inherently communal, gain is usually social
rather than financial. Nonetheless, in Wives and Daughters, the gossip
of the town women complements the central blackmail plot and
threatens to ruin the heroine Molly’s reputation, which for a
Victorian woman was one of the most valuable forms of property.
As in Dickens’s novels, the blackmail plot of Wives and
Daughters illustrates how the relationship between privacy and
intellectual property can be perverted by the commodification of
private information. Molly’s stepsister Cynthia became engaged to
Mr. Preston at a young age, in part because she owed him money. She
now wishes to break the engagement, but Mr. Preston insists that she
is bound to him, and he threatens to publish her private letters, which
contain not only vows of love but also derisive comments about her
mother. It is precisely because these letters contain personal
information that they have value for Mr. Preston, and he treats them
as a commodity, with which he can barter. Molly demands that he
78.
79.
(1866).
80.
81.

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 196.
ELIZABETH GASKELL, WIVES AND DAUGHTERS 415 (Penguin Books 1996)
Id. at 103.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 196.
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return Cynthia’s letters and tells him he has no right to them. He
responds, “No legal, or no moral right? which do you mean?” 82 Cases
such as Pope v. Curll and Woolsey v. Judd suggest that Mr. Preston
would have no legal right to publish these letters, but she steers clear
of the law and makes a moral argument that he has no right “as a
gentleman, to keep a girl’s letters when she asks for them back again,
much less to hold them over her as a threat.”83 The situation becomes
still more complicated when Molly is seen alone with Mr. Preston,
and the town comes to believe she is carrying on a relationship with
him. Ultimately, through some complex plotting, Cynthia retrieves
and destroys her letters and the widespread rumors about Molly are
corrected. By leading us through Mr. Preston’s misevaluation and the
town’s eager gossip, Gaskell underscores the proper way to value
private information and written communications.
3.

The Privilege of Communal Privacy

Blackmail depends on one individual’s having access to another’s
privacy, but Dickens and Gaskell are careful to stress that its harm
inheres in a malignant understanding rather than mere access, and
they repeatedly champion the sharing of private information in more
positive contexts. Here again, the authors take their cue from
intellectual property rights. If a potential downside of conceptualizing
private information along the lines of intellectual property is
commodification, a benefit of this model is a recognition of the
inalienable nature of both written works and privacy. Intellectual
property rights explicitly honor the author’s competing needs for
privacy and publicity, for to publish a literary work is not to divest
oneself of unique ownership of it. Dickens and Gaskell perceived
their literary works as expressions of self in which they possessed
particular rights even as these works circulated among an audience.
Similarly, they acknowledged that to share private information
with a sensitive audience must not be to lose control over it. Like a
written work, a secret can be conveyed to another while remaining in
the possession of its original owner. Both privacy and intellectual
property rights, recognizing that people exist in social networks,
accommodate the desire to protect certain information without
84
isolating oneself. In Dickens’s and Gaskell’s novels, intimacy is

82.
83.
84.
kind of

GASKELL, supra note 79, at 479.
Id.
Intellectual property rights protect expression but not underlying ideas, while the
privacy Dickens and Gaskell champion protects ideas. There is, nonetheless, a
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incorporated into privacy, as characters share personal information
with close friends and family members. The authors insist that that
intimacy is an aspect of privacy rather than its antithesis and that the
sharing of secrets need not erode privacy. In their fiction, characters
are respected as the authors, and therefore owners, of their private
experiences, which they can selectively publish. Personal information
remains under the control of the person it concerns even as this
information circulates among members of a group, much as
intellectual property remains under the control of its author even as it
circulates among an audience. As long as each person respects the
other’s unique interest in, and control over, personal information,
sharing secrets in intimate relationships enhances privacy’s meaning.
In both Bleak House and Wives and Daughters, the injury of
blackmail is underscored by affirmative disclosures of personal
matters. Those disclosures simultaneously enhance individual
subjectivity and interpersonal bonds. If Tulkinghorn threatens Lady
Dedlock’s privacy and identity, the narrator Esther carefully protects
her birthmother’s personal life. Esther learns about her own heritage
and Lady Dedlock’s past in a letter. Respecting the privacy of the
85
letter, Esther reads it only when she is “[s]afe in [her] own room,”
and she immediately burns it to prevent an accidental disclosure.
Though it concerns her own past, she regards the secret as Lady
Dedlock’s property, much as Pope v. Curll deemed unpublished
letters the legal property of their authors rather than recipients:
“[T]he secret I had to keep . . . was not mine, and I did not feel that I
had a right to tell it.”86 Esther respects Lady Dedlock’s message as
private property that she has been privileged to see but does not own.
She does not treat the correspondence as a commodity or in any way
exercise control over its contents. Much as intellectual property
remains the inalienable property of the author even when
communicated to another, Lady Dedlock’s secret remains within her
control even though she has shared it with Esther. Because Esther
guards this private information, her shared knowledge is a comfort to
Lady Dedlock.
Similarly, in Wives and Daughters, privacy is not a question of
inaccessibility but one of control, and implicit contracts protect
individuals’ private lives and guarantee selective disclosure. The most
significant secret in the novel—that Osborne Hamley is married—
fundamental similarity. I discuss the distinction between ideas and expressions infra at
note 137 and accompanying text.
85. DICKENS, supra note 75, at 520.
86. Id. at 525.
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becomes not the gold of a blackmailer, but rather the center of an
agreement to protect privacy. While Molly is visiting Hamley Hall,
Osborne receives a letter from his wife and does not notice that Molly
is present in the room. He is devastated by the publication of this
secret to “a third person,” but Molly promises him she will never
speak of it.87 She recognizes the secret as his private property and
respects his right to retain control over this personal information.
When he realizes that she will not exploit his inadvertent trust, he
casts his private information as a shared possession and tells her, “It is
a relief to think that some one else has my secret.”88 Gaskell insists
that private information can be shared for the good of all and that
intimacy is often a more desirable form of privacy than solitude.
Osborne benefits from sharing his private information with a trusted
friend, and he retains his privacy, because Molly’s motives with
regard to the secret are identical to his own.
Shared privacy also proves essential in untangling the novel’s
blackmail plot. Molly intervenes on her stepsister’s behalf, and
Cynthia finds great relief in sharing her secret. If Mr. Preston’s
commodification and exploitation of Cynthia’s personal information
is a sign of his weakness, Molly’s handling of this information speaks
to her high character. Unlike Mr. Preston, who claims Cynthia’s
letters as his own property, Molly recognizes her stepsister’s secret as
Cynthia’s property to disclose or not as Cynthia chooses. Even when
her own reputation is impugned by town gossip, Molly insists that she
has no right to invade Cynthia’s privacy: “Papa, I cannot tell you all.
89
It is not my secret.” She sounds much like Bleak House’s Esther
discussing Lady Dedlock’s secret. Indeed, Molly resembles an Esther
with more gumption. Like Esther, Molly recognizes that another’s
private information should remain within her own control.
Gaskell’s most extended meditation on the positive aspects of
sharing private information with an intimate group occurs in her
novel Cranford, in which she posits a communal privacy. This privacy
protects the self-determination of its members and allows them to
form close relationships through sharing, while retaining ownership of
their private information. In his foundational discussion of
eighteenth-century novels, Ian Watt argues that the “privacy of the
suburb is essentially feminine,”90 and that letter writing is “the form of
personal intercourse most suited to the way of life which the suburb
87.
88.
89.
90.

GASKELL, supra note 79, at 210.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 516.
WATT, supra note 9, at 187.
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represents.”91 The suburb Cranford takes these generalizations to the
extreme, for it “is in possession of the Amazons; all the holders of
houses above a certain rent, are women,” who communicate with
each other and the outside world, gendered male, largely through
written correspondence.92 Letters in this novel straddle concerns of
privacy and intellectual property and reproduce in literary form
individuals’ personalities. Miss Jenkyns’s letters are “stately and
grand, like herself,” while Miss Matty’s letters are “nice, kind,
rambling.”93 Moreover, Miss Matty values her family letters because
they seem to keep “the warm, living hearts that so expressed
themselves” perpetually alive, and she insists on destroying these
letters so they do not “fall into the hands of strangers.”94 Nonetheless,
she shares the letters with Cranford’s narrator, Mary Smith, and
thereby impresses that information need not be exclusive to a single
individual to be private. By characterizing these letters as “only
interesting to those who loved the writers,”95 Miss Matty offers a
communal way of valuing private information. This view is the
inverse of blackmail—whereas blackmail turns on a recognition of
and disregard for the private meaning of personal information, these
letters are precious only to someone who has access to their private
meaning.
Mary Smith’s letter to Peter Jenkyns depends on just such an
assessment of private information. She writes to Miss Matty’s longlost brother to inform him of his sister’s bankruptcy and carefully
protects Miss Matty’s privacy; the letter “should affect him if he were
Peter, and yet seem a mere statement of dry facts if he were a
stranger.”96 The figure of speech with which Mary refers to her letter
drives home the writing’s status as an extension of the self. She notes,
“It was gone from me like life—never to be recalled. . . . [T]he little
piece of paper, but an hour ago so familiar and commonplace had set
out on its race.”97 Her comment highlights the peculiar status of
intellectual property: publication sends it into the world, but it
remains intimately connected to its author, according to Mary, as a
child. Indeed, Mary’s metaphor recalls seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury copyright debates, in which a book was cast as an author’s
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 190.
ELIZABETH GASKELL, CRANFORD 39 (Penguin Books 1986) (1851-53).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 180.
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child. As Daniel Defoe wrote, “A Book is the Author’s Property, ’tis
the Child of his Inventions, the Brat of his Brain.”98
Gaskell’s treatment of letters in Cranford also highlights a
noteworthy point about all forms of intellectual property: they are
unique creations of authors but are nonetheless informed by other
works. Seemingly ironically, Miss Jenkyns, whose letters Mary
describes as “like herself,” has developed her personal style by
copying the writing of Samuel Johnson. As Miss Jenkyns insists, “Dr.
Johnson’s style is a model for young beginners. . . . I have formed my
own style upon it.”99 More generally, British letter-writing manuals
emphasized correspondents’ ability to express themselves naturally
and transparently, but such naturalness was actually a cultivated art
that demanded studying collections of published letters: “The skills of
private revelation and intimate conversation were learned through
the public medium of print. Many correspondents . . . shaped their
subjectivity through their letter writing, but they were able to do so
only because of the models and conventions that were publicly
available to them.”100 Contrary to the Romantics’ claims, literature is
also never entirely original; as Northrop Frye has famously argued,
“Poetry can only be made out of other poems; novels out of other
novels.”101
So too, the private self can only develop through social
interaction. The very fact that Miss Jenkyns’s letters do resemble her
and that subjectivity could be shaped through letter writing
underscores that subjectivity and autonomy are the products of social
relations. Individuals do not develop in isolation, but rather form the

98. Quoted in ROSE, supra note 16, at 39. Catherine Gallagher argues that alongside
of and competing with this metaphor of authorship-as-paternity was the “degradingly
female” metaphor of authorship-as-prostitution. Catherine Gallagher, George Eliot and
Daniel Deronda: The Prostitute and the Jewish Question, in SEX, POLITICS, AND SCIENCE
IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY NOVEL 39, 40 (Ruth Bernard Yeazell ed., 1986).
Addressing this dichotomy in the seventeenth century, Harold Love writes, “[T]he modes
of reproduction characteristic of print and script pointed, at the level of metaphor, towards
a socially approved and a socially disapproved mode of procreation.” HAROLD LOVE,
THE CULTURE AND COMMERCE OF TEXTS: SCRIBAL PUBLICATION IN SEVENTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND 153 (1993). Diverging from both paternity and prostitution, Mary
posits a legitimate female metaphor for authorship—the author as mother.
99. GASKELL, supra note 92, at 48.
100. John Brewer, This, That, and the Other: Public, Social, and Private in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,
in
SHIFTING THE BOUNDARIES:
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LANGUAGES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AND THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1, at 11 (Dario Castiglione & Lesley Sharpe eds., 1995).
101. NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS 97 (1957).
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self in response to others.102 One such way people negotiate their
personalities is through public discourse and writing. The private self
depends on the public sphere of print, of articulation and
communication, to forge itself.103 In Cranford, public writings are
incorporated into the private self, which then reproduces its thoughts
as writing.
As the private self responds to the larger community, personal
information can also be the property of a group, and Gaskell suggests
that communal privacy can be the basis for individual dignity. In
Cranford, the very act of protecting privacy fosters intimacy, for
privacy flourishes through an unspoken agreement to protect the
dignity of each woman and the group as a whole. The gentility of the
Cranford women is a mass fiction in which they all voluntarily
participate. When Captain Brown dares to acknowledge his poverty
“not in a whisper to an intimate friend, the doors and windows being
previously closed; but in the public street! in a loud military voice!”
the women look upon this as treacherous, for they have all “tacitly
104
agreed” to ignore their poverty.
Although some instances of protecting privacy seem ridiculous,
the women’s actions more often preserve human dignity. All of the
townspeople, for instance, know about Miss Matty’s love for Mr.
Holbrook, but they allow her to believe her “effort at concealment”
has succeeded.105 After Mary watches Miss Matty to detect signs of
this love, she feels “almost guilty of having spied too curiously into
that tender heart” and resolves “not to speak of its secrets,—hidden,
Miss Matty believed, from all the world.”106 Because the community
does not discuss her love, Miss Matty retains control over this private
information; she can discuss it or not as she chooses. Although her
love is not secret, her friends allow her to believe it is, and this
strengthens both her sense of autonomy and the community’s

102. Object relations theory holds that the self develops through relationships with
others and stresses the early mother-child relationship. For a review of the literature, see
JAY GREENBERG & STEPHEN MITCHELL, OBJECT RELATIONS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORY (1983).
103. See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 49 (Thomas
Burger trans., 1989).
104. GASKELL, supra note 92, at 42.
105. Id. at 81.
106. Id. at 80.
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intimacy.107 Similarly, when Miss Matty goes bankrupt, Miss Pole calls
a private meeting of her friends, and each woman writes down how
much money she can contribute on a sealed paper, which will be
opened by Mary’s father under pledge of secrecy. This confidentiality
serves two functions: the women can give “in a secret and concealed
manner, so as not to hurt [Miss Matty’s] feelings” by making her
aware that they know of her bankruptcy, and the women also
preserve their own privacy and dignity by not sharing their financial
status with one another.108 Each individual retains control of her
private information, and the communal arrangement secures the
utmost privacy for everyone.
What is fundamentally at stake in Gaskell’s and Dickens’s fiction
is not so much the ownership of specific information as the ownership
of the self and the chance for individuals to represent themselves as
they choose. The authors take advantage of fiction’s unique ability to
make us imaginatively experience others’ violations of privacy, and
we judge characters through their dealings with privacy. As we
encounter both positive and negative models for handling privacy
within the novels, we may ourselves take a cue for reading and choose
to align ourselves with the positive models, regarding our access to
the novel’s private information as a privilege we must respect.

IV. The Reader and the Novel’s Private Community
Of course, it seems ironic to locate privacy in the Victorian
novel, which dramatizes the private lives of characters for a mass
audience. While the personal information the novel discloses is, of
course, fictional, it is not the reality of the privacy, but rather the call
for its invasion that seems problematic. Peter Brooks maintains that
“the novel’s concern with privacy is necessarily constituted as an
invasion of privacy,” for it “can make private life the object of its
concern only through invading the private sphere by opening it up to
the irrevocable publicity of writing.”109
If writing signals an ironic erosion of privacy, it is the act of
reading that ultimately seems to undermine the championing of
privacy within the novel, for the course of the narrative depends on
the reader’s desire to discover hidden information, and the teleology

107. D. A. Miller discusses secrecy in David Copperfield in related terms, maintaining
that the social function of secrecy “is not to conceal knowledge, so much as to conceal the
knowledge of knowledge.” D. A. MILLER, THE NOVEL AND THE POLICE 206-7 (1988).
108. GASKELL, supra note 92, at 191.
109. BROOKS, supra note 47, at 30-32.
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of Victorian novels requires that the reader uncover all secrets in the
end. Reading well often entails the unique invasion of discovering
secrets unknown to the characters themselves. Readers, for instance,
almost inevitably understand love interests before the characters
involved. We know that David Copperfield loves Agnes before he
admits it to himself, and the same goes for Molly and Roger in Wives
and Daughters. The structure of the detective novel—a favorite of
nineteenth-century literary inventions—is particularly antithetical to
privacy. In Bleak House, for example, readers want to uncover Lady
Dedlock’s secret and Esther’s past as much as the novel’s detectives
do, and Dickens encourages our probing by both temporarily
obstructing and finally rewarding our efforts.
Decisive moments in two other popular Victorian novels—
Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley and Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in
White—perhaps best convey the reader’s apparent invasion of
privacy. In Brontë’s novel, Louis Moore enters Shirley Keeldar’s
room when she is absent and examines her private space and
possessions. As Barbara Leah Harman argues, “Louis’s investigation
110
of Shirley’s private places is really a violation of her private places.”
After he inspects her things, he begins to write in his journal, and the
narrator encourages us to inspect his writing: “Come near, by all
means, reader; do not be shy: stoop over his shoulder fearlessly, and
read as he scribbles.”111 Our bold reading mirrors his own, and just as
his investigation invades Shirley’s privacy our reading of his journal
would seem to invade Louis’s. The narrator even casts our invasion as
physical, so that it occurs on the same narrative plane as his. Ours is,
then, a double violation: we invade Shirley’s privacy with Louis,
perhaps even as we condemn his behavior, and we proceed to invade
his own privacy. Later in the novel, the narrator offers another
passage from Louis’s journal and addresses the reader directly: “Yet
again, a passage from the blank book, if you like, reader; if you don’t
like it, pass it over.”112 This acknowledgment that we may not wish to
read the passage underscores our earlier encouraged violation, as well
as our continuing invasion of privacy, because, of course, the narrator
is not only censuring, but inciting our reading.
In Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White we similarly read
extracts of Marian Halcombe’s diary and, upon reaching the end,
encounter a postscript written by the villainous Count Fosco, who, it
110. BARBARA LEAH HARMAN, THE FEMININE POLITICAL NOVEL IN VICTORIAN
ENGLAND 41 (1998).
111. CHARLOTTE BRONTË, SHIRLEY 487 (Penguin Books 1985) (1849).
112. Id. at 580.
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turns out, has been reading Marian’s diary along with us. Fosco
expresses his genuine admiration for Marian and writes, “My strict
sense of propriety restores [the diary] (by the hands of my wife) to its
place on the writer’s table.”113 We are disturbed, I believe, both by
Fosco’s invasion of Marian’s privacy and by his hypocritical respect
for propriety. We may even feel violated by Count Fosco’s reading
over our shoulder, as it were, even though we too are reading a
private diary. How can we condemn his reading of this private
document while condoning our own? We might ask a similar question
of reading David Copperfield, which David presents as a personal
history we should not be seeing. The full title of the work is The
Personal History, Experience, and Observation of David Copperfield
The Younger of Blunderstone Rookery Which He has Never Meant to
be Published on any Account, and throughout the novel David
repeatedly refers to the privacy of his history, as when he writes,
“[T]his manuscript is intended for no eyes but mine.”114 How, then, do
we understand our reading of this novel as something other than an
invasion of privacy?
The Victorian novel, I contend, does not present invasions of
privacy so much as it draws the reader into an inner circle of privacy
and teaches us to value the personal information of characters. The
very intimacy of reading stems from our sharing private knowledge
and our interest in characters’ welfare. We are not like Fosco,
because we do not wish to harm Marian’s sister, but instead desire her
well-being. As readers we have the firm conviction that characters,
including Marian, would willingly share their private lives with us,
because we would value them as such.
Our approach to the novel’s privacy is modeled for us by
characters, who, as I have discussed, often protect each other’s
privacy through an implicit contract. Very few secrets are known to
one person alone; rather, information is shared between characters,
such as Esther and Lady Dedlock or Cynthia and Molly. One
individual reveals a secret when she is sure that the other will keep it
private, and this information becomes a shared possession of the
characters and fosters their intimacy. Such disclosures do not threaten
privacy, for the characters attribute the value of the information to its
personal nature, rather than its commercial potential, and they
respect one another’s control. These interactions within the novel are
mirrored by the reader’s own experience with the text: a gradual

113. WILKIE COLLINS, THE WOMAN IN WHITE 359 (Penguin Books 1974) (1860).
114. DICKENS, supra note 58, at 563.
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introduction to the private lives of characters makes us care about
and feel intimate with them, and we therefore believe that our access
does not undermine their privacy. Like individuals in the novels, we
respect characters’ control over their personal information.
There is an irony underlying our sense of these characters’ lives
as personal: “It is paradoxical that the most powerful vicarious
identification of readers with the feelings of fictional characters that
literature had seen should have been produced by exploiting the
qualities of print, the most impersonal, objective, and public of the
media of communication.”115 It is, however, the impersonal nature of
print that allows us to lose consciousness of the artifice of writing and
to regard the book as an “extension of our personal life—a private
possession.”116
While reading, moreover, we not only experience the private
information of characters as something valuable because of its
personal meaning, but also regard the novel as a form of intellectual
property related to its author’s personality, rather than a commodity.
We come to develop a relationship with this author, who in the
Victorian novel, often dramatizes himself or herself and addresses us
directly. This personalization of the reader’s relationship with the
author is also rather ironic, for it occurred as novels were being mass
produced for an ever-expanding audience. Over the course of the
nineteenth century, novels became deeply embedded in the market
economy through serial production, but authors partially defied the
market’s burgeoning commodifying power by understanding the
value of their works in personal terms. To resist commodification,
authors not only advocated on behalf of intellectual property rights as
personal interests, but also strove to cast their relationships with
readers as intimate. Acutely conscious of the tension between what
Pierre Bourdieu has labeled material exchange and symbolic
117
exchange, circulation and communication, authors recognized their
novels as material goods circulating in the market, but they also
regarded them as a communication between themselves and their
readers. It is the communicative aspect of their creations that they
chose to emphasize. Precisely because their novels were being mass
produced, Victorian authors wrote their own personalities into the
text and engaged directly with the reader, whom they apostrophized
as an individual. As Thackeray wrote of Dickens, there is “a
115. WATT, supra note 9, at 206.
116. Id. at 198.
117. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans.,
1997).
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communion between the writer and the public . . . something
continual, confidential, something like personal affection.”118 Mary
Poovey similarly suggests that in David Copperfield, the protagonist’s
authorship seems to be “simultaneously an expression of self and a
gift to others.”119 By treating their novels as works that had value
independent of the market, authors both defined intellectual property
as a unique, personal kind of property and increased their market
share.
Dickens’s idea for a periodical that he would call “The Cricket”
exemplifies this highly productive, if tenuous, relationship between
mass production and personalization. He wrote to John Forster that
he would be like a cricket chirping on family hearths: “I would at
once sit down upon their very hobs and take a personal and
confidential position with them which should separate me, instantly,
from all other periodicals published.”120 Dickens’s novels further
reflect this desired mass intimacy with readers, for he begins each
with a preface that establishes a confidential relationship between
author and audience. In Martin Chuzzlewit, Dickens speaks of this
ritual as something particularly meaningful to him, writing that he
includes the preface “more because I am unwilling to depart from any
custom which has become endeared to me by having prevailed
between myself and my readers on former occasions of the same kind,
than because I have anything particular to say.”121 Throughout the
novel, he continues to address his readers directly. The fact that he
calls attention to our presence means that we do not feel we are
invading the private realm within the novel. We are not snooping or
spying, like Louis Moore or Count Fosco, because the author is aware
of our presence, and perhaps by implication the characters are as
well.
In Dombey and Son, moreover, Dickens implies that not all
publications of private information are violations. Writing about his
1842 visit to the U.S., he had complained about newspapers “pulling
off the roofs of private houses, as the Halting Devil did in Spain;
pimping and pandering for all degrees of vicious taste.”122 But in
Dombey and Son, he associates his own writing with an innocuous
version of these invasions of privacy and calls “for a good spirit who
would take the house-tops off, with a more potent and benignant
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Quoted in POOVEY, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 70, at 104.
Id. at 101.
4 THE LETTERS OF CHARLES DICKENS, supra note 53, at 328 (July 1845).
DICKENS, supra note 55, at 5.
DICKENS, supra note 61, at 210.
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hand than the lame demon in the tale.”123 Taking off house-tops is not
only the Halting Devil’s project, but Dickens’s own, yet he insists that
his novelistic depictions of the private sphere are different from those
of the newspapers because of his “benignant hand.” Through
Dickens’s authorial role, the reader, too, assumes a benevolent stance
toward the characters and their private information, and this
orientation casts our reading as a welcomed sharing, rather than an
invasion of privacy.
In Bleak House Esther herself, in her dual role as narrator and
character, perceives the reader as a friend, and her highly selfconscious narration repeatedly appeals to our sympathy. Her first
words are, “I have a great deal of difficulty in beginning to write my
portion of these pages, for I know I am not clever,” and she proceeds
to discuss her childhood doll, to whom she told all of her secrets.124 By
associating readers with her doll, she makes us intimate friends, an
audience for her secrets. In her closing words, Esther bids her
“unknown friend,” the reader, goodbye, “Not without much dear
remembrance on my side. Not without some, I hope, on his or
hers.”125 Because she specifically addresses us and prepares her story
for our eyes, we feel secure that we are not invading her privacy.
Dickens’s novel stresses that information can remain private, through
the intimate relationship among character, author, and reader, even
as it is published.
Somewhat curiously, the novel that insists we are invading its
characters’ privacy is also the one in which Dickens’s communal
model for privacy is most apparent: David Copperfield. Despite
David’s claims that his manuscript is for his eyes only, he addresses us
directly throughout his work and invokes our privileged
understanding: “The reader now understands, as well as I do, what I
was when I came to that point of my youthful history to which I am
now coming again.”126 So too, the actual author of David’s life story
welcomes the reader as a close friend. In the preface to the First
Edition, Dickens writes that his interest in the novel is so great that
he is in danger of “wearying the reader whom I love, with personal
confidences, and private emotions.”127 In his preface to a later edition
123. CHARLES DICKENS, DOMBEY AND SON 540 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (184648).
124. DICKENS, supra note 75, at 30.
125. Id. at 877.
126. DICKENS, supra note 58, at 54.
127. DICKENS, supra note 58, Preface to the First Edition, available at
http://www.bibliomania.com/0/0/19/1992/26457/1.html (last accessed Jan. 27, 2004).
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he adds, “I can only take the reader into one confidence more. Of all
my books, I like this the best.”128 With this admission, Dickens
demands our special consideration of his novel according to the
implicit contract governing our reading. Through his prefaces and
David’s addresses, the foreboding portion of the title, “Which He has
Never Meant to be Published on any Account,” becomes not a sign of
the reader’s violation but rather an injunction to share the novel’s
respect for privacy. We have been taken into both David’s and
Dickens’s confidences, and this leads us to see the book as an
intimate confession, rather than a story we are not meant to read.
A communal privacy, in which readers share and respect the
secrets of characters, is still more apparent in Gaskell’s novels. The
narrator of Mary Barton casts herself as an active “I” within the text;
she tells us that she was not at Jem’s trial, and of legal summonses
writes, “Many people have a dread of those mysterious pieces of
129
parchment. I am one. Mary was another.” By repeatedly addressing
the reader in the second person, she draws us onto the narrative plane
of the fiction and positions us as her friend and correspondent. As we
read, we experience the narrator as a vivid, personal presence, and we
regard the novel as a personal communication between ourselves and
this embodied writer, who holds a pen and creates the text we are
reading.130 Gaskell advanced such a personal relationship with the
reader not only within the novel, but also in her own correspondence.
In one letter, she declared, “Do you think I cd say or write in a letter
(except one that I was sure wd be regarded as private by some dear
friend) what I have said both in MB [Mary Barton] & Ruth? It may
seem strange & I can’t myself account for it,—but it is so.”131 Her
ability to address private subjects in her novels could, of course, have
followed from the distance between herself and the reader, as well as
the possible distance between herself and her narrative voice. But the
comment also implies that her novels are, in some essential sense,
private communications. She would not share the information in a
letter that would be public, but she specifically constructs her
relationship with her readers so that we resemble intimate friends.
Our reading of her novels is therefore markedly different from a
stranger’s seeing a personal letter. Because Gaskell establishes
128. DICKENS, supra note 58, Preface to the “Charles Dickens” Edition, available at
http://www.bibliomania.com/0/0/19/1992/26458/1.html.
129. GASKELL, supra note 63, at 255.
130. See ROBYN WARHOL, GENDERED INTERVENTIONS: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE IN
THE VICTORIAN NOVEL 56, 65 (1989).
131. THE LETTERS OF MRS. GASKELL, supra note 66, at 255-56 (Dec. 6, 1853).
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intimacy, she trusts that her relationship with us will be one of mutual
respect and concern.
Cranford is still more intimate a communication than Mary
Barton. The entire novel is written as a letter by Mary Smith to a
London resident, and the letters within the novel are therefore
microcosms of the novel itself. Gaskell’s description of Mary’s letter
to Peter powerfully documents the process of writing and publishing a
novel for a possibly unreceptive audience and underscores the kind of
audience Gaskell seeks in us.132 As readers, we must exhibit the
respect for the novel and its characters that these characters show for
each other’s letters. When Miss Matty and Mary read and burn the
family epistles so that they do not fall into the hands of strangers, we
become a part of their community of readers, rather than the
strangers from whom the correspondence must be hidden. Similarly,
much as Mary’s letter to Peter protects the privacy of all involved and
Miss Matty’s family’s letters are interesting only to those who loved
the writers, Cranford itself is a bundle of stories, largely lacking plot,
and only of interest to those who care about the characters. Through
the novel’s discussions of letters, Gaskell indicates the proper manner
of reading to her audience: Cranford is a letter that allows author and
reader to enter into an intimate private community.133
As this suggests, we learn from Cranford’s characters how to
relate to the novel’s private information. When Mary feels guilty for
spying into Miss Matty’s heart, she resolves not to discuss or ask
about her past love; although she knows Miss Matty’s secret, she is
not free to violate her privacy. We must similarly respect the privacy
of information we encounter in the novel and not pry too much. As
Hilary Schor argues, “Not only does Miss Matty’s ‘affection’ stay a
secret but narrative knowledge is secret; Mary Smith is a closet
narrator, and the role of literature is to present secrets as somehow
intact in their secrecy.”134 Of course, our lack of respect for characters’
privacy would not have the same consequences as other characters’
violations of trust. By temporarily immersing us within a fictional
132. See SCHOR, supra note 66, at 116.
133. There is, significantly, a sense in which Cranford was more than just a novel for
Gaskell, who described it as “the only one of my books that I can read again.” THE
LETTERS OF MRS. GASKELL, supra note 66, at 747 (Feb. 1865). She made repeated
references in her letters to life itself being like a story from Cranford; for example, she told
Eliza Fox about a deal she got on ribbons and declared, “‘Elegant Economy,’ as we say in
Cranford.” Id. at 174 (Dec. 1851). Similarly, she told John Forster “a Cranfordism” about
an old woman who said she could not spell since she lost her teeth. Id. at 290 (May 17,
1854).
134. SCHOR, supra note 66, at 101.
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community, however, the novel illuminates private relations in a
particularly valuable way. Our imaginative engagement with
characters’ personal lives provides a vivid model for actual
interactions and shows us what is at stake in individuals’ control over
private information.
Like Mary Smith in Cranford, Gaskell herself is both character
and narrator in The Life of Charlotte Brontë, and this creates a strong
sense of community with the reader. She enhances this personal
relationship by revealing her anxieties about publishing private
information, such as details of Brontë’s married life, which is
“considered by some, at first sight, of too private a nature for
publication.”135 Despite drawing our attention to a possible invasion
of privacy, Gaskell’s very anxiety makes us respect her disclosures as
private; we do not feel that she is violating Brontë’s privacy so much
as communicating sensitive information to an intimate circle. At the
end of the biography, Gaskell explicitly turns “from the critical,
unsympathetic public” and commits the memory of Brontë to the
“larger and more solemn public.”136 It is curious that Gaskell casts her
sympathetic readership as the “larger” public, for we might expect it
to be the smaller circle. This, however, draws attention to a
fundamental aspect of reading itself: the intimacy that emerges
between author and reader. Gaskell is confident that the very nature
of reading will lead the majority of her readers to actively engage with
Brontë’s private life and respect her privacy, and her final statement
serves as an appeal and injunction for readers to recognize themselves
as part of a private community that is privileged to access Brontë’s
private life.
The way in which the reader of Gaskell’s and Dickens’s novels
has access to private information while not being in control of it
reflects not only the personal relationship that authors establish
among themselves, their characters, and their readers, but also a
central aspect of intellectual property. Unlike other forms of
property, which can be appropriated only through a specific transfer,
such as a sale or theft, intellectual property can belong to the author
137
while also being imaginatively appropriated by the reader. Indeed,

135. GASKELL, supra note 68, at 397.
136. Id. at 429.
137. Brook Thomas discusses the two ways to possess a work of art: “On the one hand,
someone can hold legal title to it and copyright the earning power brought about by its
publication. On the other, someone with no legal claim at all can ‘possess’ a work through
an imaginative act of appropriation.” BROOK THOMAS, AMERICAN LITERARY REALISM
AND THE FAILED PROMISE OF CONTRACT 79 (1997).
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intellectual property laws prohibit readers from copying works or
using the author’s expressions as their own, but readers are welcome
to appropriate the ideas within books, and this is precisely what it
means to be a good reader. Readers share the novel’s ideas with the
author, but the author retains control over the expression of these
ideas. This has been a consistent facet of intellectual property for
centuries; in the eighteenth century, distinctions were already drawn
between ideas and expression. Echoing Justice Hardwick’s separation
of material and immaterial aspects of a letter in Pope v. Curll, Fichte
wrote that the material book belongs to the reader upon purchase,
while the form in which ideas are presented remains the property of
the author; and he went a step further than Hardwick, declaring ideas
the common property of author and reader.138
The ideas we appropriate through the act of reading, moreover,
become incorporated into our own private selves, so that the
intellectual property of others becomes a part of our subjectivity.
George Eliot stressed the particularly influential nature of literary
texts when she declared that humans are “imitative beings. We
cannot, at least those who ever read to any purpose at all, . . . help
being modified by the ideas that pass through our minds.”139 As with
letters in Cranford, then, the very subjectivity of readers is informed
by the writings of others. Dickens acknowledges this relationship in
David Copperfield when David discusses his library and insists that he
has been shaped by Tom Jones, Don Quixote, and Robinson Crusoe.
Through an act of intellectual appropriation, he has made these
books both the shared property of himself and their authors and a
part of his private self, which he now pours into his manuscript. By
reading David Copperfield, we enter David’s private world and in
turn incorporate his ideas into our own subjectivity. As Dickens’s
novel joins the other works of David’s library on our bookshelves,
David Copperfield joins these eponymous heroes in our
consciousness.

V. Conclusion
Today, concerns about privacy are again prevalent as new
technologies threaten our ability to control information about
ourselves. What mass publication and urbanization were to the
Victorians, it seems, computer databases and Cyberspace have
138. See WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE
HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 51 (1994).
139. 1 THE GEORGE ELIOT LETTERS 23 (Gordon Haight ed., 1954-78).
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become to us. These new “technologies of the self”140 again have the
paradoxical effect of both enhancing privacy and facilitating invasions
of this privacy, and our false sense of security in private information
makes invasions all the more troublesome.
As invasions of privacy have called attention to the importance
of private information for both the autonomous self and intimate
relationships, a number of legal scholars have suggested treating
private information as a form of intellectual property.141 Many effects
of this proposal would be positive; for example, property rights would
recognize the individual’s sense of ownership of personal information
and also accommodate people’s desires for differing degrees of
privacy. Interestingly, both proponents and detractors of this proposal
highlight its commodification of information: advocates argue that
property rights will enable individuals to control their personal
information,142 while critics insist that privacy should not be
commodified.143
It is at this juncture, I believe, that the Victorian novel’s
treatment of privacy and intellectual property is particularly
informative. Victorian authors use intellectual property as a model
for informational privacy precisely because it offers control without
necessarily entailing commodification. Dickens’s and Gaskell’s novels
stress that the value of intellectual property inheres in the author’s
self-expression and that the right to control this property stems from
its link to the self. Similarly, in their novels, characters must retain
control over their private information in order to resist
commodification by others, and, as with intellectual property, the
right to control this information derives from its close relationship to
the self. By using intellectual property as a model for private
information, Dickens and Gaskell explore how individuals’ control
140. Brewer, supra note 100, at 17.
141. See supra note 3.
142. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 3; Laudon, supra note 5; Murphy, supra note 3;
Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1134-35.
143. See, e.g., Simon G. Davies, Re-engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has
Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE 125 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997), at 161 (“The process of
commodification [of private data] is inimical to privacy”); Jessica Litman, Information
Privacy/Information Property. 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000) (concluding that a property
rights approach would in fact encourage the market in personal data rather than
constraining it). A necessary corollary of treating personal information as property is that
others are prohibited from speaking about an individual, and several critics have drawn
attention to the First-Amendment implications of such a proposal. See, e.g., Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a
Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1113 (2000).
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over their personal information can create a robust sense of privacy
and enhance both self-determination and intimacy.
By contrast, most contemporary proposals that advocate treating
private information as a form of intellectual property nonetheless cast
privacy as a commodity. In their initial incarnation, intellectual
property rights protected not the author, but rather booksellers and
stationers—the closest thing early modern England had to
corporations. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, several
intellectual property cases and statutes acknowledged the intimate
connection of authors to their works and relocated property interests
in the self-expression of these authors. Despite the much-touted
“death of the Author”144 in recent years, Anglo-American law
continues to recognize authors as the creators and owners of unique
works. What has changed, however, is that an author is as likely to be
a corporation as an individual, and forms of intellectual property are
widely regarded as commodities rather than expressions of authors’
selves.145 Today companies predominantly exercise intellectual
property rights as any other property right. Lawrence Lessig argues
that corporations are over-served by our modern system, and he
descries the bloating of intellectual property law; focusing on the
Internet’s transition from an open forum for ideas into a mechanism
protecting corporate interests, he argues for a return to traditional
understandings of copyright that balanced the rights of the public to
access works with the rights of individuals to control their creations.146
The Victorian novel offers readers just such a model of the organic
connections among author, creation, and audience.
A reconsideration of intellectual property rights that emphasizes
the author’s close relationship to the work would also usefully inform
contemporary debates about privacy rights. Indeed, Victorian
authors’ understandings of copyright, which relied on the work’s
connection to the self, are more conducive to protecting privacy rights
144. Roland Barthes has famously argued that “the birth of the reader must be at the
cost of the death of the Author.” Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE,
MUSIC, TEXT 142, 148 (Stephen Heath trans., 1978). Michel Foucault maintains that “the
author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our
culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses.” Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in THE
FOUCAULT READER 101, 118-119 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984).
145. See, e.g., Catharine Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire
Doctrine, 15 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1, 1 (2003) (arguing that the author “has been
subsumed into the identity of his corporate employer. His disappearance is by now almost
complete. Although he has gone on writing, the corporation has become the author of his
oeuvre”).
146. See Lawrence LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN
A CONNECTED WORLD (2001).
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than current understandings. Rather than accept the severance of
self-expression and control, we should regard the right to control selfexpression and private information as stemming from their ties to the
autonomous self. When we value private information as a commodity,
we reinforce corporations’ usurpations of personal data as property
and overlook what is truly important about protecting private
information. As readers of Victorian novels understand, people must
be able to control their personal information because what is
ultimately at stake is not this information alone, but the integrity of
the self.

